Conspiracy Theory: The Use of the Conspiracy Doctrine in Times of National Crisis by Siesseger, Marie E.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 3 Article 6
Conspiracy Theory: The Use of the Conspiracy
Doctrine in Times of National Crisis
Marie E. Siesseger
Copyright c 2004 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Marie E. Siesseger, Conspiracy Theory: The Use of the Conspiracy Doctrine in Times of National Crisis,
46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1177 (2004), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol46/iss3/6
CONSPIRACY THEORY: THE USE OF THE CONSPIRACY
DOCTRINE IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
Prosecuting those who are alleged to have posed threats to
national security presents unique challenges to the legal system,
challenges that American jurisprudence frequently appears
inadequately equipped to meet. As a result of both the secretive
nature of many anti-government and terrorist organizations as well
as the difficulty of identifying the exact nature of the threats such
groups pose, the government often resorts to the charge of conspir-
acy when indicting these cases. This practice has resulted in the
gradual expansion of the doctrine of conspiracy, most notably in the
wake of heightened national security threats.1
The conspiracy charge is an especially malleable one and
represents something of an anomaly in our system of criminal
jurisprudence, which generally affords individuals stringent
protections in the face of potential abrogation of their liberty.2
Although the subject of much criticism, the crime of conspiracy has
an established, and undoubtedly warranted, place in American
jurisprudence.3 The purpose of this Note is not to challenge the
doctrine of conspiracy as a whole or even to question the specific
factors presumed to define the parameters of a conspiracy in the
prosecutorial context. Instead, the discussion will revolve around
two relatively discrete eras of heightened political and social
concerns in American history-the McCarthy Era and the modern,
post-9/11 era-and the implications of those concerns for the scope
1. See R.S. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES AND AGREEMENTS 48-49 (1887)
(noting a few specific instances of enlargement and stating that "the law of criminal
combination has gone somewhat beyond the bounds of the ordinary criminal law").
2. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(characterizing conspiracy as an "elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense").
3. Cf. Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137,
1141 (1973) (arguing that the crime of conspiracy is no longer necessary).
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of conspiracy charges made in cases that-were emblematic of the
particular sensitivities of their respective eras. Through an
examination of these two eras, in which political and social pres-
sures coalesced in highly charged prosecutions, this Note will show
that because the doctrine of conspiracy is so readily adaptable, it
has the potential to become perverted and unduly expanded when
political and social stresses are placed upon it.
Conspiracy's central weakness-the potentially over-expansive
reach of its scope--creates a quagmire into which events involving
political and social threats to national security inevitably become
entangled. As Justice Jackson noted in his concurring opinion to
Krulewitch v. United States,
[tihe crime comes down to us wrapped in vague but unpleasant
connotations. It sounds historical undertones of treachery, secret
plotting and violence on a scale that menaces social stability and
the security of the state itself .... Conspiratorial movements do
indeed lie back of the political assassination, the coup d'etat, the
putsch, the revolution, and seizures of power in modern times,
as they have in all history.4
Jackson's candid acknowledgment of the political component of the
impetus behind conspiracy law exposes a critical flaw in the
system-that it allows courts to give in to the "strong temptation to
relax rigid standards when it seems the only way to sustain
convictions of evildoers."5
Almost from its inception, the crime of conspiracy has been
subject to flagrant abuse. Originally conceived as a method to curb
abuse of the legal system,6 it ballooned into an almost unrecogniz-
able version of its rather humble, and strictly limited, beginnings.
It failed to withstand the reactionary pressures against the "Strict
Law" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during which it
4. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 457. Jackson also notes that statutes for substantive crimes eliminate the
dangers to individual liberty and the integrity of the judicial process. Id.
6. See Solomon A. Klein, Conspiracy: The Prosecutor's Darling, 24 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1
(1957); see also JAMES WALLACE BRYAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF
CONSPIRACY 23 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1909) (noting that "tihe action by writ of conspiracy
could be brought by a person who had been acquitted upon a false indictment preferred by two
or more persons acting in concert).
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was transmogrified into a shadowy specter of its former, neatly
defined self.7 In particular, during this period the doctrine of
conspiracy failed to ward off evidentiary encroachment, specifically,
the admission of acts that are not otherwise criminal into a
conspiracy trial.' This expansion is one of the more troubling
aspects of this doctrine. In more recent judicial memory the law of
conspiracy has been the subject of what amounts to a virtual
revolution in thought. Conspiracies today are often massive, hulking
entities encompassing a broad spectrum of actors, acts, and
localities.9
The following discussion reviews the traditional scope of conspir-
acy, followed by an examination of the background circumstances
and applications of the conspiracy doctrine in both the McCarthy
and post-9/11 eras. Through the juxtaposition of the application of
conspiracy in these two eras against the backdrop of the general use
of conspiracy, the imprimatur of socio-political pressures on the
former becomes apparent. In a global community of intense
ideological differences, the threat posed to individual nations'
security by collective acts of terrorism and political violence is
acutely felt. However, over-reliance on traditional mechanisms for
curbing such threats, especially the doctrine of conspiracy, carries
the potential for distorting those mechanisms beyond recognition.
I. THE TRADITIONAL SCOPE OF CONSPIRACY
In the first eight words of his explanation of the conspiracy
doctrine, Professor LaFave characterizes the crime of conspiracy
as "somewhat vague."1 This characterization is telling and far
7. See Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 400 (1922).
8. Id. at 402-03 (indicating that Lord Hawkins' "unfortunately ambiguous statement ...
[that]: There can be no doubt, but that all confederacies whatsoever, wrongfully to prejudice
a third person, are highly criminal at common law,"' is the source of this problematic
component of conspiracy) (quoting HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 6 ed., bk. I, ch. 72, § 2,
p.348).
9. See Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever
Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2 (1992) (noting that in
the 1970s, no one would have believed possible the now common "mega-trials" for conspiracy,
nor would the "dramatic structuring by the Supreme Court of the rules of evidence in
conspiracy cases" have been foreseen).
10. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.1 (2d ed. 2003).
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from unique." Justice Jackson used exactly the same term in his
condemnation of the ever-broadening sweep of conspiracy prosecu-
tions in his concurrence to Krulewitch v. United States." The
following discussion illustrates how the crime of conspiracy
developed into such a vague doctrine.
A. Background
Conspiracy did not begin life in the troubled state it finds itself in
today. The crime of conspiracy has a comparatively lengthy
history, 3 however, early conspiracy law lacked the flexible flavor of
its modern-day counterpart. The original incarnation of the doctrine
was as a series of statutes enacted strictly for the purpose of
remedying abuses of legal procedure. 4 The strictures of the
statutory enactments underwent a gradual permutation process
beginning in 1611 with the Poulterers' Case, and continued intermit-
tently thereafter. 5 In that case, the Star Chamber declared that the
statutory limitations regarding the requirements of a false indict-
ment were immaterial and that confederation constituted the gist
of the crime." This sudden expansion of the scope of conspiracy
proved to be the flashpoint at which the steadily brewing cauldron
of social pressures ignited, producing in 1615 the opinion in Bagg's
Case, which first proclaimed the criminality of an unexecuted
11. See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 7, at 393 (assessing criminal conspiracy law as "[a] doctrine
so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature ... [that it] lends no strength
or glory to the law").
12. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ('The
modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies definition.").
13. Sayre, supra note 7, at 394 ('The origin of the crime of conspiracy goes back to the very
early pages of the history of our common law.").
14. BRYAN, supra note 6, at 11 ("Conspiracy was limited to combinations whose object was
to hinder or pervert the administration of justice."); Sayre, supra note 7, at 396 ("[I]t was
limited to offenses against the administration of justice, and was strictly confined to the
precise and definite language of the statutes. Combinations only to procure false indictments
or to bring false appeals or to maintain vexatious suits could constitute conspiracies.").
15. See Sayre, supra note 7, at 398 ('Thus was taken the first step in the long process by
which the early rigidly defined crime of conspiracy was, through judicial, analogical extension,
gradually expanded into the vague and uncertain doctrine which we know to-day."); see also
BRYAN, supra note 6, at 58-59 ("Mhe Poulterers' Case represents a long step in advance of
existing principles."); Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624,
625 (1941).
16. Sayre, supra note 7, at 398.
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conspiracy.17 In this case, the King's Bench went so far as to declare
the legitimacy of its exercise of extrajudicial power, stating that "to
this Court ... belongs authority, not only to correct errors in judicial
proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanors extrajudicial,
tending to the breach of the peace ... so that no wrong or injury ...
can be done, but that it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due
course of law."'" This tendency toward extrajudicial justice is
particularly pernicious in the conspiracy context, because it gives
rise to gross misuse of the doctrine, especially in the face of social
pressures such as those that prevailed in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. 9
The penal codes of European nations governed by civil codes
approach conspiracy in a somewhat different manner and provide
an interesting counterpoint to this discussion."° Rather than using
conspiracy as a separate and self-contained offense, these countries
generally use conspiracy as the basis for increasing the sentences
attached to substantive crimes.2' Even this approach is subject to
the vicissitudes of popular sentiment regarding situations involv-
ing national security, and many countries decree that "when no
substantive offense has been completed ... certain types of conspira-
cies are [still] proscribed-notably those directed against the
security of the state, those involving many participants organized for
the purpose of committing numerous crimes, and those contemplat-
ing particularly serious offenses."22 Even judicial systems that have
maintained a somewhat more stringent adherence to the definitions
of conspiracy detailed in their respective codes2" carve out a special
niche for conspiracies in which national security is implicated,
17. BRYAN, supra note 6, at 59.
18. Sayre, supra note 7, at 400-01.
19. Id. at 400 (noting that "[d]uring the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a reaction
set in, in favor of a broader, more moral law").
20. Note, Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 923
(1959).
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added); see also Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Conspiracy in Civil Law
Countries, 42 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171, 172 (1951) (noting that "where the security of
the state is at stake, the law is more watchful than in other cases; and it creates exceptions").
23. Wagner, supra note 22, at 175. In France, the Civil Code has slightly broadened the
notion of what constitutes a conspiracy, but "this idea is still not equal to the common law
general approach to the problem of conspiracy." Id. The first flirtation of the German Civil
Code with conspiracy was "only in the field of offenses against the state." Id.
2004] 1181
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highlighting both the gravity of conspiracies against the state and
the underlying principle of criminal law, the protection of society.
B. Scope
1. Scope Defined
There are many troubling aspects to the crime of conspiracy, but
perhaps the most critical is the ill-defined parameters into which a
conspiracy must fit. Defining the scope of a conspiracy has extensive
evidentiary ramifications and is therefore of particular importance.24
The scope of a conspiracy is defined by the court that evaluates it,
however, and there is no truly systematic and universal process that
courts employ to ascertain the precise boundaries of a conspiracy.
Therefore, the delineation of the conspiracy is controlled by the
central element of the crime-the agreement.25
The agreement is the "essence of conspiracy," and the crime of
conspiracy "is complete on proof of an agreement between two or
more persons to effect an unlawful purpose."26 As one treatise
explains, "[t]he agreement is all-important in conspiracy, for one
must look to the nature of the agreement to decide several critical
issues," including mens rea and the possibility of multiple conspira-
cies.27 Whether an agreement exists depends on the facts and
inferences appropriately drawn from them.28 No degree of formality
24. See generally FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
25. See Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65
GEO. L.J. 925, 950 (1977) ("The crime of conspiracy is the illegitimate agreement, and the
agreement is the crime."); see also United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,860-61 (4th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the requirement of a specific agreement but agreeing that the "proper contours of
conspiracy law" are defined by reference to the agreement).
26. Ian H. Dennis, The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy, 93 L. Q. REV. 39, 40 (1977); see
also annelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975) ("Conspiracy is an inchoate offense,
the essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.").
27. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(d)
(1986).
28. See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 710-13 (1943) (analyzing the facts
of the case to find the requisite intent and agreement).
When the evidence discloses ... a system ... itihe step from knowledge to intent
and agreement may be taken. There is more than suspicion, more than
knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, lack of concern. There is
informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation. And there is also
a 'stake in the venture' which, even if it may not be essential, is not irrelevant
[Vol. 46:11771182
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is required to prove an agreement, indeed, a "mere tacit understand-
ing" may be sufficient. 29
The extent of the agreement is defined almost solely by reference
to the facts presented to establish it. As noted by the Supreme Court
in Braverman v. United States, "when a single agreement to commit
one or more substantive crimes is evidenced by an overt act ... the
precise nature and extent of the conspiracy must be determined by
reference to the agreement which embraces and defines its objects."3
With respect to the potential for multiple conspiracy charges to stem
from a single agreement, the Court further explained that "[t]he one
agreement cannot be taken to be several agreements and hence
several conspiracies because it envisages the violation of several
statutes rather than one."3"
The Court's semantic distinction merely displaces the factual
investigation by analyzing it in the context of the broader agree-
ment-whether the scope of the agreement dictates the scope of the
conspiracy or the scope of the conspiracy is examined directly makes
little practical difference. The Court's analysis also injects a highly
subjective element into considerations of scope, because it requires
an evaluation of the evidence that is almost wholly without
boundaries32 and that is predicated on the notion that there is or
was a conspiracy to be proven.33 In practical terms, the prosecution
makes the preliminary decision regarding the breadth of the
conspiracy by determining how expansive an agreement to prove,
to the question of conspiracy.
Id. at 713.
29. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 27, § 6.4(d).
30. 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 168 F.2d 846, 857 (9th Cir. 1948), affid, 336 U.S. 613
(1949) (noting that "wide latitude is allowed in presenting evidence, and it is within the
discretion of the trial court to admit evidence which even remotely tends to establish the
conspiracy charged"); see also Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 20, at 984 ("Evidence of
criminal offenses less related to the crime charged is allowed in conspiracy prosecutions [sic]
than in the prosecution of crimes other than conspiracy.") (footnote omitted).
33. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[A] conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon assumption that
conspiracy existed."); see also United States v. Twitty, 72 F.3d 228, 231 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting
that "more often than not, none of the agreements [comprising a conspiracy] is explicit;
agreement is inferred from conduct; and the conceptual tests used to distinguish between one
conspiracy and many are not sharp edged").
2004] 1183
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and the judge or jury makes the ultimate decision based on the
evidence presented.
Recognizing the potential for abuse of discretion by factfinders
charged with determining the scope of a conspiracy, Alvin H.
Goldstein cautions that "[u]nbridled expansion of the scope may
result in a prosecution based on guilt by association."34 Goldstein
offers a rather optimistic appraisal of the ability of the doctrine to
constrain the scope of the charge, however, stating that "[t]he
substantive requirement, that each conspirator know the essentials
of and specifically intend the purpose of the common design, limits
the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy."35 In contrast, the
contention of this Note is that the link between the knowledge of co-
conspirators and the objective of a conspiracy is so loose as to be
essentially unbounded, particularly when external pressures are
operative.
Addressing the difficulties inherent in making the factually based
determination about the appropriate scope of a conspiracy, the court
in Scott v. United States stated that
[w]hen forbidden conduct is extended in duration or elaborate in
its phases, it is not always easy to determine the proper unit for
purposes of prosecution. In some instances each day's action or
inaction is made a separate offense; in others a longer course of
action constitutes a single offense.... Where to draw the line, in
the absence of clear statutory delineation, presents a problem to
one's judgment and sense of fairness.3"
Indeed, the problem identified by the court-that the determination
of scope is left entirely up to the unbounded and ill-defined "sense
of fairness" possessed by the finder of fact-is precisely why courts
must exercise caution in rendering decisions regarding the extent
of a conspiracy. The Scott court also concluded that when actions are
"separate and distinct," the defendant is "not entitled to telescope
the two offenses into one."37 What constitutes a "separate and
distinct" offense, however, is a wholly discretionary decision based
34. Alvin H. Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 GEO. L.J. 133,
145-46 (1965).
35. Id. at 146.
36. 255 F.2d 18, 20 (4th Cir. 1958) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 21.
[Vol. 46:11771184
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on the evidence. Despite its trepidation, the Scott court gave no
guidance as to how the evidence may be evaluated to reach a
decision, preferring instead to leave such matters to the legislature.
Furthermore, the leniency that the court expressed, and, in
particular its acknowledgment of the difficulty of line-drawing,
suggests a willingness, albeit with misgivings, to accept a conspiracy
painted in broad, sweeping strokes for the sake of prosecutorial
convenience.
As a basic matter, courts look to three factors to define the scope
of a conspiracy: the time frame, geographic scope, and subject
matter of the alleged conspiracy." In distinguishing between
situations where there are multiple conspiracies and where there is
a single conspiracy, the courts have long referred to these factors.39
Courts also often look to membership as an indicator of the scope of
a particular conspiracy.4"
The temporal aspect of the conspiracy may be one of the more
readily manipulated elements in this trio of factors. As the court in
United States v. Therm-All, Inc. noted, "to prove a conspiracy during
38. See United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 318 (4th Cir. 1982); see
also Sayre, supra note 7, at 397 (noting that in a 1351 case Justice Shardelowe refused to
strain the strict borders of the conspiracy doctrine to convict on a charge that failed to
demonstrate the scope of the conspiracy by including the year, day, place, and subject matter
of the crime with sufficient specificity).
39. Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 619-20 (4th Cir. 1937) (identifying as chief factors
in this analysis the "periods of time covered by the conspiracies as alleged; ... [the] difference
in the places charged as the places of conspiring; ... [and] difference in the persons charged
as coconspirators"); see also Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964)
(concurring with the treatment in Short).
40. Membership in a conspiracy is a factual determination that is complicated somewhat
by the existence of several organizational possibilities in the case law. The two generally
accepted varieties are the hub-and-spoke model (one central actor who has dealings with
multiple others, each of whom knows that the other agreements must exist), and the chain
model (successive actors, each performing a particular role necessary to the completion of the
object). LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 27,§ 6.5(d)(2). Determining who falls within the ambit
of a particular conspiracy is crucial to protecting a defendant's constitutional rights, however.
See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772-73 (1946):
Guilt with us remains individual and personal, even as respects conspiracies....
When many conspire, they invite mass trial by their conduct. Even so, the
proceedings are exceptional to our tradition and call for use of every safeguard
to individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass. Wholly different is
it with those who join together with only a few, though many others may be doing
the same and though some of them may line up with more than one group.
(emphasis added).
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a certain time period, the Government must produce evidence of an
overt act that implies the existence of the alleged conspiracy during
that time, regardless of whether the act be in furtherance of or an
actual part of the conspiracy."41 This formulation of the time span
of a conspiracy, although a practical solution to the problem, is not
a particularly elegant one, as it would appear to allow for situations
in which otherwise inconsequential acts are used to dramatically
expand the life span of a conspiracy.
Geographic considerations are of particular interest in conspiracy
cases, because they potentially afford the government a wide variety
of venues in which to prosecute. The Court reaffirmed this basic
principle in Hyde & Schneider v. United States, where the Court
stated that "[w]e have held that a conspiracy is not necessarily the
conception and purpose of the moment, but may be continuing. If so
in time, it may be in place."42 With the technological developments
in transportation and communications, the location of discrete
conspiratorial acts may mark an extremely far-ranging boundary.
The ability to portray a conspiracy covering such vast distances
could convey to the finder of fact an inflated idea as to actual
breadth of the conspiracy.
Both of these factors and the subject matter component find their
origin in the criminal agreement, which, because its parameters are
not necessarily delineated with any degree of specificity,43 remains
an essentially blank slate upon which the prosecution may write its
theory. The court in United States v. Andolschek44 summarized this
peculiar phenomenon of conspiracy law well:
[A] party to a conspiracy need not know the identity, or even the
number, of his confederates; when he embarks upon a criminal
venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its
41. 352 F.3d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 2003), opinion withdrawn by, substituted opinion at 357
F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2003).
42. 225 U.S. 347, 363 (1912).
43. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 860-61 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Because we believe that
these precepts set the proper contours of conspiracy law, setting parameters regarding
specificity of the agreement is difficult to harmonize with the elastic, ad hoc principles that
shape our conspiracy jurisprudence.").
44. 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
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content and membership, so be it that they fall within the
common purposes as he understands them.45
The indeterminacy of the standard for defining the scope of a
conspiracy creates a terrific opportunity for exploitation by the
prosecution.
2. Hypothetical
By way of illustration, assume that there is a group composed of
actors X, Y, and Z, all of whom agree to commit fraud on a federally
insured financial institution. X is a California banker, Y is a bank
manager in Texas, and Z lives in New York. X and Y each order
their secretaries, B and C, respectively, to prepare fraudulent loan
applications for submission to a bank. B knows that some of the
material he is filling in on the applications is falsified, but he
nevertheless completes the assignment. C is new at her job and does
not know or suspect that she is being used as a conduit for fraud. In
preparation for the processing of the falsified loans, Z sets up an
offshore account through which to funnel the money after consulting
with D, who has been Z's financial adviser for the past twenty-five
years and who works in Washington. Z briefly contemplates
bringing D into the conspiracy but ultimately decides not to, instead
simply utilizing D's talent and resources for his nefarious purposes
without ever directly speaking about his true purpose to D. D does
not have a strong reason to suspect that Z is engaged in anything
that is not wholly above-board, but there have been clues that would
suggest that Z may be involved in a dishonest scheme. Z has
mentioned to D that he has a new business associate named X who
may be interested in availing herself of D's services.
When the cover on this conspiracy is blown, there are a number
of possible defendants. As the principals, X, Y, and Z are clear
choices for prosecution, having made the initial agreement and
executed several overt acts, including setting up the offshore
account and causing the fraudulent applications to be submitted. B
is also an obvious target as a result of his knowing assent to the
preparation of the false documents. The government would have an
45. Id. at 507.
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even stronger case against B if he had put Y and Z's names on the
applications as well. C is clearly not a good choice for prosecution-
she simply does not have the requisite mens rea. There is a far less
clear case against D. The element of knowing participation in the
agreement seems to be lacking in D, but, depending on the vigor of
the prosecutors and the weight the jury gives to the "clues" that D
might have picked up on, D's marginal position with respect to the
conspiracy might cut sufficiently against her to make prosecuting
her both feasible and successful.
The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate that, by adding a
marginal player to the host of conspiracy defendants, a potentially
undue expansion of the conspiracy takes place. By charging D in the
conspiracy, the prosecution gains access to an entirely new venue
(Washington) and possibly even enlarges the time frame of the
conspiracy. For example, if D had proceeded to invest the laundered
funds, the conspiracy likely would have continued.
C. Object
The object of the conspiracy is by no means strictly confined, and
it is "possible for the object dimension of a conspiracy to include the
commission of several substantive offenses" or even to be of
"indeterminate scope," encompassing all those crimes that are "in
fact undertaken."4 This degree of indeterminacy reflects the notion
that conspiracy is a significantly more flexible crime than suggested
by the supposed stringent limitations on the scope of the infraction.
The assessment of the object of the conspiracy as potentially
including a vast, and possibly unknown, number of offenses and
actions is accurate to the extent explained by Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Crimmins: "[i]t is never permissible to enlarge
the scope of the conspiracy itself by proving that some of the
conspirators, unknown to the rest, have done what was beyond the
46. An example is a hypothetical group called "Murder Incorporated," which contemplates
"the commission of other than a definite number of crimes. Each member of it therefore 'takes
his chances,' and is party to a conspiracy whose object dimension includes the offenses in fact
undertaken." Note, supra note 20, at 929-30. The hypothetical's authors do not offer any
further guidance as to the construction of this criminal alliance, but it can be presumed that
the name "Murder Incorporated" envisions the commission of homicide and any crimes
incidental to it. In this manner, at least, there is some degree of limitation on the potential
liabilities of the members.
1188 [Vol. 46:1177
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reasonable intendment of the common understanding."47 This
limitation, although seemingly vital, is likely to be quite flaccid in
practice. Judge Hand further explained that
[w]hile one may, for instance, be guilty of running past a traffic
light of whose existence one is ignorant, one cannot be guilty of
conspiring to run past such a light, for one cannot agree to run
past a light unless one supposes that there is a light to run
past.48
This conclusion is ultimately unsatisfying, because it runs headlong
into the original problem of defining the scope of the conspiracy by
reference to an agreement about which typically very little is
known.
The evidentiary implications of conspiracy have been critically
important in shaping the current doctrine. Due to the clandestine
nature of conspiracies, circumstantial evidence is typically the
principal, and often only, type of evidence used to establish the
requisite agreement and its corresponding scope.49 In response to
the inherent challenges of demonstrating a covert agreement,
"courts seem to be overcompensating for the difficulties faced by the
prosecution."' This overcompensation reaches its pinnacle when
courts are presented with an alleged conspiracy that is coupled with
socio-political overtones. Indeed, Goldstein acknowledges the
breadth of the prosecutor's powers with respect to conspiracy by
writing that "[t]he danger of injustice which flows from the hearsay
exception increases in proportion to the prosecutor's willingness to
carry his case to the full extent authorized by conspiracy law."'"
By returning to the hypothetical posited in Part I.B.2, it is easy
to expose the flexibility of the object component of conspiracy
doctrine. If D is brought into the case as a defendant, the prosecu-
tion has far greater latitude in developing the object of the conspir-
acy, because D's alleged involvement may introduce new facets
of fraud to the conspiracy. For example, if D was independently
47. 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).
48. Id.
49. Note, supra note 20, at 984.
50. Id.
51. Goldstein, supra note 34, at 140.
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involved in another scheme that also entailed laundering money
through foreign banks, this evidence could potentially be extremely
difficult to segregate from the charged scheme and thus could be
used to implicate D in this conspiracy as well. The prosecution may
also be at an advantage in that the addition of D avails them of a
whole host of supplemental overt acts, likely including virtually any
work D did for Z after agreeing to join the conspiracy. Additionally,
from a prosecutorial standpoint, D's financial prowess is a highly
desirable characteristic for a conspiracy defendant involved in a
fraud scheme.
As noted by Patrick Broderick in his article addressing the
conditional objectives of conspiracies, "[t]he majority of questionable
rulings dealing with the object scope of conspiracies expand that
scope beyond the dimensions necessary to prevent likely crimes or
to apprehend conspirators who are dangerously resolved to commit
an object crime."52 Indeed, as many commentators have suggested,
the sole defensible rationale for the conspiracy doctrine is the belief
that the prevention of the sort of group danger inherent in a
conspiracy can be accomplished only through a mechanism that
deters criminal group efforts before they begin.53 When the bound-
aries of this somewhat flimsy rationale are breached, the crime of
conspiracy becomes increasingly fragile.
II. THE MCCARTHY ERA CASES
A. Historical Underpinnings: The Communist Threat
The growth of organized labor in the 1930s fostered an infrastruc-
ture that was rife with possibilities for perceived and actual
conspiratorial endeavors.54 With structural mechanisms in place
52. Patrick A. Broderick, Conditional Objectives of Conspiracies, 94 YALE L.J. 895, 902
(1985).
53. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 9, at 3-5 (noting that "[tihe argument for added danger
for conspiracies has never been supported by any sort of empirical data, and thus it is
extremely difficult to justify the presence of the crime, at least in situations where other
offenses could be charged").
54. ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF McCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS
8 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that "[t]he most important organizations with which [Communist)
party members became involved were trade unions"); see also ARTHUR HERMAN, JOESPH
McCARTHY: REEXAMINING THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF AMERICA'S MOST HATED SENATOR 67
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and strong Communist leaders at the forefront of the trade unions,
the reactionary voice of anti-Communists emerged, disguised in
conciliatory overtones.55 The shroud of secrecy in which most of the
Communist leaders cloaked their party affiliation became a liability
"when the political climate changed, [because] the Communists' lack
of openness took on sinister overtones."56
In the 1940s and 1950s, America lived in the throes of a pervasive
fear of the unknown. As Joseph A. Beirne announced, "[w]e live in
alarming times.... Communism has spread, like a prairie fire, in the
old world."57 Fueled by public outcries such as Beirne's, anxiety
about the threat of covert Communist infiltration into U.S. govern-
ment, trade unions, and countless other elements of society rose to
unprecedented levels and culminated in a collective need for
reassurance and security. 8 As Arthur Sabin notes, "there was a
dread of Communist subversion, spying, and influence in this
country; these fears gripped the nation with varying degrees of
intensity throughout these decades and generated the era of the Red
Scare. 59
Fear of the intangible menace grew as "[t]he cold war transformed
domestic communism from a matter of political opinion to one of
national security."' As Ellen Schrecker noted, "[p]art myth and part
reality, the notion that domestic Communists threatened national
security was based on a primarily ideological conception of the
nature of the Communist movement."61 The popular ideological
conception of Communism as a monolithic destructive force can
(2000).
55. SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 9.
56. Id.
57. Communism Is a Criminal Conspiracy: Hearing Before the Task Force of the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security, 83rd Cong. 5 (1954) [hereinafter Hearing, Communism
is a Criminal Conspiracy] (statement of Joseph A. Beirne, President, Communications
Workers of Am.).
58. See Ellen W. Schrecker, Archival Sources for the Study of McCarthyism, 75 J. AM.
HIST. 197, 198 (1988) (noting that "far from being a political aberration, much of what we call
McCarthyism received wide support from important sectors of American society").
59. ARTHUR J. SABIN, RED SCARE IN COURT: NEW YORK VERSUS THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKERS ORDER 2 (1993).
60. SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 20.
61. Id. at 21.
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largely be attributed to the extensive involvement of the federal
government in the anti-Communist crusade.
Although the machinations of the legislature in the interrogations
conducted by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)
and other investigatory bodies are often associated with the rise of
the Red Scare, "it was the executive branch of the government that
wielded the most influence over the development ofMcCarthyism." 3
While providing the "psychic setting for McCarthyism," the
executive branch further influenced popular perception through
"[t]he specific steps it took to combat the alleged threat of internal
communism."64
Societal fear of Communism underscored a series of prosecutions
during this period and presented serious substantive and procedural
dilemmas for the court system that had long-lasting implications.
The criminal justice system became a potent piece of artillery in the
battle against Communism, as Schrecker points out:
Perhaps no single weapon in the federal arsenal was as powerful
in the government's construction of the anti-Communist
consensus as the criminal justice system. By putting Commu-
nists on trial, the Truman administration shaped the American
public's view of domestic communism. It transformed party
members from political dissidents into criminals-with all the
implications that such associations inspired in a nation of law-
abiding citizens.65
The government achieved this transformation not only in the eyes
of the public, but also in the eyes of much of the judiciary.
62. Id. at 25-26 (noting that it was not the plausibility of the Communist threat but the
government's involvement that helped to generate the national obsession); see also EDWIN R.
BAILEY, JOE McCARTHY AND THE PRESS 180-81 (1981) ("The Republican landslide of 1952
made the Republicans the majority party in the Senate and installed McCarthy as chairman
of the Senate's Committee on Government Operations and of its Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations.").
63. SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 26.
64. Id. at 27. See generally Athan Theoharis, The Truman Administration and the Decline
of Civil Liberties: The FBI's Success in Securing Authorization for a Preventive Detention
Program, 64 J. AM. HIST. 1010 (1978) (describing the increasing anti-Communist sentiment
under the Truman administration and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover).
65. SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 27.
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The inherent danger in prosecutions of political dissidents is
the threat that the politically unpopular views of defendants will
be used against them in inappropriate ways. This possibility is
magnified in the case of conspiracy prosecutions but has proven to
be a stumbling block in other cases as well.6" The threat of improper
consideration of political views surfaced in the McCarthy Era trial
of the International Workers Order (IWO), a "fraternal benefit
insurance organization" characterized as "the largest left-wing
organization in U.S. history."6 The strategy of the prosecution was
to affiliate the Communist party with the IWO and insinuate guilt
by association.68 Judge Greenwood eagerly accommodated this line
of argument. He appeared "interested-in fact, evidently anx-
ious-to get at the facts of the political side of the IWO," making it
imperative that the defense "focus the Judge's attention on the
operation of the Order as an insurance company and on the legal
issues ... not on the IWO's politics."69 This attempt failed, however,
because "[iln the supercharged political atmosphere of early 1951,
maintaining a clear line of separation [between the professional
duties of the witnesses and their political views] was simply
impossible."7
The IWO trial further illustrates the pitfalls inherent in prosecu-
tions that prey on the public's emotional turmoil and fear of
breaches of national security. Sabin notes that, "[r]emoved from the
passions of the times, the interpretations Judge Greenberg made of
relevant statutes and case law appear unfounded, and reflect a
66. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1352 (1983) (discussing the possibility that political and social turmoil
may impact the judiciary in the context of the First Amendment):
Restrictive Supreme Court decisions construing the Espionage Act of 1917
during the "Red Scare" following World War I and the Smith Act during the
early 1950's, at the height of the virulent anti-Communism personified by
Senator Joseph McCarthy, promote understandable skepticism about the ability
of the judiciary to withstand periods of national hysteria.
67. SABIN, supra note 59, at 10-11 (distinguishing the IWO from the Industrial Workers
of the World, a union that predated the non-union IWO); see also Application of Bohlinger, 106
N.Y.S.2d 953, 959 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) ("The organization writes life, accident and health
insurance.").
68. SABIN, supra note 59, at 115 (noting that the government's lead witness was George
E. Powers, a former Vice-President of IWO, "who had credentials bridging the Order and the
Communist Party over a number of years").
69. Id.
70. Id. at 116.
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willingness-if not an eagerness-to use existing law for the 'higher'
purpose of liquidating the perceived political threat posed by the
continued operation of the IWO. '71 Judge Greenberg's conclusions
illustrate that if the judicial system is to retain its integrity in the
face of external pressure, it cannot condone such arbitrariness based
solely on the context of the case.
B. Scope of Conspiracy in the McCarthy Era Cases
Prosecutions of alleged and overt Communists in the McCarthy
Era encountered a special difficulty not regularly seen in criminal
trials-they were highly politicized. The furor of the era fostered,
if only indirectly, a highly polarized courtroom climate that is
evidenced in court opinions. 72 The criminal justice system faltered
when faced with the prospect of being forced to adjudicate issues
that ostensibly pertained more to political affiliations than to
genuine criminal behavior.
As Schrecker noted, "using the criminal justice system to
reinforce the government's contention that communism was outside
the law had its drawbacks. There were few laws under which the
offenders could be tried, because being a Communist was not a
crime."7 Even the staunchly anti-Communist camp could not
contest this point. While conceding that "[i]t is not yet illegal for a
person simply to be a Communist in the United States," labor leader
Joseph A. Beirne issued one of the most excoriating critiques of
Communism: "[It] is a criminal conspiracy directed against our way
of life."74
It is perhaps unsurprising that the essentially political charges
that were brought against this subset of defendants exhibited
some noticeable stretch marks, as the charged crimes-sometimes
genuine but always infused with a distinctly inapposite aura of
71. Id. at 308.
72. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (noting the gravity of the
situation by stating that the Court in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), a case that
also dealt with free speech, "[was] not confronted with any situation comparable to the instant
one-the development of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government, in the context of world crisis after crisis").
73. SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 28.
74. Hearing, Communism Is a Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 57, at 7 (statement of
Joseph A. Beirne, President, Communication Workers of Am.).
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political persecution-were pursued with a fairly broad disregard
for their statutory limitations. The charges "often bore little relation
to the presumed offense for which [the Cold War defendants] were
on trial," at least in part because of the difficulties inherent in
prosecuting cases involving national security threats and the
intelligence it generated.75 Indeed, the government apparently
turned to the conspiracy charge as something of a last resort:
"[aifter scouring the statute books in search of an appropriate
prosecution tool, the Justice Department's attorneys settled on a
conspiracy charge under the 1940 Smith Act. 76 This strategic
decision marked a critical turning point in the development of
prosecutorial theories employed against those accused in connection
with threats to national security.
The difficulty of finding a grounds for prosecution manifested
itself in the trial strategy that the government adopted. To an
extent, the prosecutors abandoned pretext altogether. As a matter
of practicality, however, the prosecution was forced to base its case
on something more substantial than mere alliance with the
Communist party, and they frequently used the vehicle of a broadly
sketched conspiracy to prosecute defendants. In this respect, the
precedent that the conspiracy prosecutions set was of particular
importance. As Richard Arens notes, "the political conspiracy of the
Dennis type confronts us as a judge-made law of substantive crime
on an ad hoc basis. Its vagueness provides unlimited possibilities for
abuse."77
As the pivotal case of the era, Dennis v. United States7" furnishes
a discrete portal through which to view the theoretical foundations
and the reception of these admittedly quasi-political prosecutions.
The defendants in Dennis were charged with various Smith Act
violations, including:
wilfully and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the Commu-
nist Party of the United States of America a society, group and
75. SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 28 (noting that "it was hard to obtain the evidence
necessary for a conviction," because the government faced the possibility of having to disclose
highly sensitive intelligence information contained in intercepted KGB communications).
76. Id. at 49.
77. Richard Arens, Conspiracy Revisited, 3 BUFF. L. REV. 242, 267 (1954).
78. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and
destruction of the Government of the United States by force and
violence, and (2) knowingly and wilfully to advocate and teach
the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the
Government. 9
As evidenced by the "broad conclusions" that the Supreme Court
avowed that the record supported,"° the prosecutorial theory in
Dennis had as its lynchpin a widely cast conspiratorial net.
The broadly painted picture of the defendants in Dennis as
operatives in a sinister society advocating overthrow of the govern-
ment and all manner of political upheaval surely contributed to the
psychological impact of the trial, both upon its immediate partici-
pants and the national psyche.8 ' The Court's characterization of the
gravity of the impending Communist threat reflects the popular
attitude:
The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspir-
acy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the
leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action,
coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, similar
uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our
relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very
least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions
were justified.... If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we
cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added. 2
This attitude was fostered in part by the trial itself, which was
plagued by a judge who was wholly lacking in impartiality and by
excessive showmanship by the lawyers for both sides.8 3 Moreover,
the political climate had an effect on the Supreme Court, and "the
justices had come to believe that communism endangered the
79. Id. at 497.
80. Id. at 498. Chief Justice Vinson cited to the court of appeals in his opinion for its
finding that "the general goal of the Party was, during the period in question, to achieve a
successful overthrow of the existing order by force and violence." Id.
81. See SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 51 (describing the atmosphere at trial).
82. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510-11.
83. See SCHRECKER, supra note 54, at 51 (noting that "[b]oth sides hoped to score political
as well as legal points").
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nation's existence and that, in the words of Justice Felix Frank-
furter, it would be wrong to treat the party's advocacy of commu-
nism 'as a seminar in political theory.' '' 4 Indeed, Judge Learned
Hand even found a veritable necessity in examining the context in
which the case arose, stating that "[w]e must not close our eyes to
our position in the world at that time."8 5
At trial Judge Medina unequivocally charged the jury with
finding a single conspiracy. In his instructions, Medina stated that
[w]hile [the indictment] refers to a conspiring to organize as the
Communist Party a society, group and assembly of persons who
teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the
Government of the United States by force and violence and also
a conspiring to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of
overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United
States by force and violence, I charge you that but a single
conspiracy is alleged.86
Medina then paused to comment that "[p]robably the prosecution
could have urged me to construe the indictment as charging a single
conspiracy with two separate objects or as charging two separate
conspiracies."" This somewhat gratuitous soliloquy reflects the
fluid construction that the court gave to the conspiracy doctrine.
Additionally, Medina contended that the single conspiracy "is
adopted because [it is] plainly in the interest of defendants and not
conceivably prejudicial to them."88 This formulation of the conspir-
acy is somewhat curious, because in most conspiracy cases defen-
dants find it to their distinct advantage to divide the allegations into
a succession of conspiracies.8 9 Judge Medina's conclusion that "[a]s
there is a single conspiracy alleged, this will also simplify your [the
jury's] labors," similarly calls into question the propriety of charging
a single, expansive conspiracy inasmuch as it suggests, in an
84. Id. at 52.
85. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
86. United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd 183 F.2d 201 (2d
Cir. 1950).
87. Id. at 376.
88. Id.
89. See United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234, 1237 (7th Cir. 1976) ("In nearly every
conspiracy case the claim is made that a variance exists because multiple conspiracies were
shown.").
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extremely subtle manner, that the work of the jury in reaching a
conviction is made easier by the consolidation of the criminal
activity into a single charge.9 °
Judge Medina likewise seemed very amenable to the suggestion
that a conspiracy's scope was not inhibited by great distances of
time or place, as is indicated by his charge to the jury that
where an unlawful end is sought to be effected and two or more
persons, actuated by the common purpose of accomplishing that
end, knowingly work together in any way in furtherance of the
unlawful scheme, every one of said persons becomes a member
of the conspiracy, although his part therein be a subordinate
one, or be executed at a remote distance from the other conspira-
tors.9
Consistent with the conventional wisdom regarding conspiracy
cases, the court, in its explanation of the application of evidence to
the charges in the indictment, charged the jury that "[i]n conspiracy
cases there is necessarily considerable latitude of admissible
evidence."92 To be sure, a scathing reproach of the wide evidentiary
latitude given to conspiracy charges would have been inappropriate
in the context of a jury instruction, but the comfort with which the
court acknowledged this fact is indicative of the general judicial
acceptance of a broadly constructed scope, particularly in a setting
in which concerns over national security were prevalent.
The Supreme Court's discussion of the limitations placed on the
government in its constant vigil of self-preservation is revealing,
and contradictory. While maintaining that the First Amendment's
guarantees are sacrosanct, even in the face of a serious threat to the
continued vitality of the United States, the Court allowed an even
more egregious infringement upon liberty to occur. The Court sat
idly by, and even occasionally looked on with approval, as the
prosecution pursued a theory of conspiracy that was so expansive as
to render almost meaningless the statutory confines of the crime.
Recounting the necessities created by threats to national security,
the Court stated that
90. Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 376.
91. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 379.
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[o]ur whole history proves even more decisively than the course
of decisions in this Court that the United States has the powers
inseparable from a sovereign nation.... The right of a govern-
ment to maintain its existence-self-preservation-is the most
pervasive aspect of sovereignty.... But even the all-embracing
power and duty of self-preservation are not absolute. Like the
war power, which is indeed an aspect of the power of self-
preservation, it is subject to applicable constitutional limita-
tions.... Our Constitution has no provision lifting restrictions
upon governmental authority during periods of emergency,
although the scope of a restriction may depend on the circum-
stances in which it is invoked.93
In Yates v. United States,94 a case that bore an uncanny factual
resemblance to Dennis, the defendants' convictions were reversed,
and the Red Scare was effectively eliminated from the judicial
radar. But serving as an historical bookend to McCarthyism was not
the sole significance of Yates. In his opinion, Justice Harlan writes
at length about the "familiar rule that criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed," in the context of defining the word "organize" in
the Smith Act. 5 Justice Harlan's lengthy recitation of this century-
old rule serves as an overture, suggesting that this precept has been
abrogated in other instances in the McCarthy Era prosecutions and,
in particular, in the overarching use of the conspiracy doctrine.9 6
Furthermore, the Court noted that
both the record and the Government's brief.., make it clear that
the Government's thesis was that the Communist Party ...
constituted the conspiratorial group, and that membership in
the conspiracy could therefore be proved by showing that the
individual petitioners were actively identified with the Party's
affairs and thus inferentially parties to its tenets.9 7
93. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519-20 (1951).
94. 354 U.S. 298 (1957); see SABIN, supra note 59, at 5-6 ("[The 1957 Supreme Court's
decision in Yates v. U.S. signaled the end of prosecutions of Communist Party members.").
95. Yates, 354 U.S. at 310.
96. Id. at 310-12.
97. Id. at 320.
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The Court's rejection of this connection between organizational
membership and criminal conduct in the context of the Smith Act
illustrates the judiciary's increasing distaste for aligning itself with
the government's demands regarding Communism.
As the shockwaves of the Red Scare reverberated throughout the
country, jolting even the federal courthouses, conspiracy became the
sanctioned all-purpose mechanism for stemming subversion.
Although the courts were perhaps the last bastions to fall victim to
fear of the Communist threat, the judiciary's dramatic shift in the
interpretation of the conspiracy doctrine during the course of the
McCarthy Era is telling. When, as in Dennis, the external pressures
on the courts rose to a critical level-one in which national security
seemed jeopardized-the courts responded by loosening the reigns
on the construction of conspiracies. When the threat subsided,
however, the courts were equally quick to retreat from their
formerly permissive position.
III. THE POST-9/11 CASES
A. Historical Underpinnings: After 9/11
Although typically summarily addressed and disposed of by the
courts currently adjudicating the fallout from September 11,98 it is
undeniable that the charges against and detentions of admitted and
suspected members of al Qaeda, particularly those of Zacarias
Moussaoui, are firmly rooted in the context of the attacks.99 The
horror of the attacks was broadcast repeatedly on television
networks across the world and described in detail in the newspapers
in the days following the attacks. 00 Escaping the deluge of informa-
98. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 512 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated by 365 F.3d
292 (4th. Cir 2004) (summarizing the events of September 11, 2001 in two sentences); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting that "[o]n September 11, 2001, the al Qaida terrorist network launched an attack on
the United States resulting in approximately 3,000 fatalities").
99. See Indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (4th
Cir. 2003) (No. Crim. 01-455-A).
100. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4Airliners, Destroy World Trade Cenler,
Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert,
WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
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tion and emotions in the early hours and days after the attacks was
impossible.
The events of September 11 shook the American psyche and had
repercussions around the world. As noted by Christopher Hewitt,
"[tihe American response was ... unprecedented. All commercial
air traffic was grounded for two days.... The Justice Department
launched 'the most massive and intensive investigation ever
conducted in America."'10 1 The Washington Post commented on
September 12th that "[i]t was terrorism of a scope once unimagin-
able."102 It did not take a team of noted psychologists to understand
that "[i]n a matter of moments, the United States had become a
gravely disoriented country tottering on the brink of chaos." 103 As
aptly noted by the editorial writers of The Washington Post, "[t]he
horrific terrorist attacks yesterday in New York and Washington
will rank as one of the greatest calamities in American history, and
will confront the United States with one of its most demanding
challenges.""1 4
In a study commissioned by the American Psychological Associa-
tion, several psychologists noted that "[tierrorism, as the word
implies, capitalizes on the human capacity to experience terror.
Terror is, in turn, a uniquely human response to the threat of
annihilation."'0 5 The ramifications of that terror were immediate
and pronounced. The national mood swung like a pendulum, "from
panic to patriotism."10 6 Within ten days, President George W. Bush
had announced that "[o]ur war on terror will not end until every
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated," setting in motion a multifaceted campaign against
terrorism. "17
Riding on mercurial public emotions, the PATRIOT Act was
passed just over a month after the attacks amidst a great deal of
101. CHRISTOPHER HEwIrr, UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN AMERICA: FROM THE KLAN TO
AL QAEDA 1 (2003).
102. Editorial, Washington's Response, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A30 [hereinafter
Washington's Response].
103. But such a group did record that observation. TOM PYSZCZYNSKI ET AL., IN THE WAKE
OF 9/11: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR 4 (2003).
104. Washington's Response, supra note 102, at A30.
105. PYSZCZYNSKI, supra note 103, at 8.
106. HEWITT, supra note 101, at 4.
107. John Kelly, The Man Behind the Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2001, at C12.
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bipartisan support and sharp criticism.108 The unsettled state of
American emotions manifested itself in the form of bumper stickers
emblazoned with stars-and-stripes and continued, largely unabated,
even through Thanksgiving 2003.109 Patriotic songs that were
formerly reserved for the Fourth of July and Memorial Day became
common in a wide variety of venues."1 0 Video game developers
retooled their products to eliminate any potential overtures to
terrorist attacks.' President Bush acknowledged the pervasive
fears in his September 20, 2001, address: "I know many citizens
have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in
the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of
America and remember why so many have come here."1 2
B. Scope of Conspiracy in Post-9/11 Cases
A significant theme in the debate over alleged "twentieth hi-
jacker" Zacarias Moussaoui's prosecution concerns the scope of the
conspiracy to be charged. Although a point of contention in all but
the most commonplace conspiracies, the scope of the conspiracy
charged in United States v. Moussaoui is of particular importance
because of the socio-political pressures operative upon the case. 3
As this Part will show, due to the extraordinary external pressures
exerted on the judicial system, the scope of the charged conspiracies
in the Moussaoui prosecution has been widened far beyond that
which is typical, setting a dangerous precedent for future civilian
trials of alleged terrorists.
108. See Dana Milbank, House Bill Would Expand Federal Detention Powers, WASH. POST,
Oct. 2, 2001, at Al (describing the proposed bill).
109. For a bit of humor, see Reilly Capps, Free to Strut His Stuffing, WASH. POST, Nov. 25,
2003, at C01 (noting that "pardoned" turkeys were named Stars and Stripes by popular
consensus).
110. Tim Page, 'God Bless America,' The Song in a Nation's Heart, WASH. POST, Sept. 21,
2001, at CO.
111. Mike Musgrove, Reality-Based Rethinking: Sept. 11 Altered Landscape for Video-Game
Makers, Players, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2001, at E12.
112. Transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 2001, at A24.
113. 333 F.3d 509, 512 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453,
457-58 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Simultaneously with its prosecution of Moussaoui, the Executive
Branch has been engaged in ongoing efforts to eradicate al Qaeda and to capture its leader,
Usama bin Laden.").
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Per the government's own admission, "Moussaoui is charged in
six broad conspiracy counts that include as overt acts, inter alia, the
preparation for and execution of the terrorist attacks of September
11.,,114 The prosecutorial theory specifically rests on the proposition
that Moussaoui was connected with and agreed to the conspiracy to
carry out the attacks and therefore can properly be charged with the
overt acts committed by his co-conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracies." 5 However, the government specifically, and some-
what speciously, contends that "Moussaoui is not charged, as
standby counsel and the defendant repeatedly have phrased it, with
'September 1 1. '16 This claim seems suspect when considered in the
context of the Death Notice submitted concurrently with the
indictment, which effectively alleges that Moussaoui's actions
caused the deaths on September 11. 17 Indeed, the courts that have
handled Moussaoui's case appear to see little practical distinction
between the specifically enumerated crimes"' and "September
11th."' 19
114. Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Access at 8, United States v.
Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 01-455-A), available at http://
notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/l:01-cr-00455/docs/69021/1.pdf.
115. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
116. Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Access at 7-8, Moussaoui (No. 01.
455-A).
117. See Standby Counsel's Response to the Government's Opposition to Defendant's
Motions for Access at 2 n.1, Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A), available at http://notablecases.
vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69045/1.pdf. The defendant himself, from what can be
gathered from his semi-coherent ramblings, fails to appreciate the distinction, as he noted:
"So Let's me get it Right, Now 'Moussaoui is Not Charged-with September 11.' Motion by
Zacarias Moussaoui at 2, Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A), available at http://notablecases.vaed.
uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/69094/1.pdf.
118. The Second Superceding Indictment charges Moussaoui with (1) conspiracy to commit
acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, (2) conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy,
(3) conspiracy to destroy aircraft, (4) conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, (5)
conspiracy to murder United States employees, and (6) conspiracy to destroy property. Second
Superceding Indictment at 1, Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A), available at http://notablecases.vaed.
uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/66826/0.pdf.
119. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4870 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2004) (denying appeal
of vacation of order granting Moussaoui leave to represent himself, stating that "Zacarias
Moussaoui is charged with multiple offenses stemming from his acknowledged membership
in the terrorist organization al Qaeda and his alleged involvement in the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks"); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 512 (4th Cir. 2003).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The government's semantic hair-splitting 2 ° was both recognized
and criticized by Judge Brinkema in her October 2, 2003, ruling:
[A]pproximately seventy-five percent of the Indictment concerns
the activities of the nineteen alleged hijackers on and before
September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, the United States maintains
that the charged conspiracies are not conspiracies to carry out
the September 11 attacks. Instead, the United States has, at
times, broadly characterized the underlying unlawful agreement
as "al Qaeda's conspiracy to attack the United States," al
Qaeda's "war on the United States" in which its members would
''use virtually any means available to murder Americans en
masse," and "a coordinated plan of attack upon the United
States that included flying planes into American buildings. 12'
In this opinion Brinkema acknowledged the government's obvious
upper hand, in that "it need not prove the defendant's participation
in the September 11 attacks to obtain a conviction in this case. 122
In fact, according to the theory promulgated by the government, the
conspiracy that is alleged is significantly broader than the events of
September 11 alone and includes "the dissemination of fatwahs
regarding attacks against American personnel in Somalia, the use
of training camps to prepare legions of al Qaeda adherents for the
holy war Bin Laden declared against the United States, and al
Qaeda's efforts to obtain components of nuclear weapons."'23 The
advantage of the conspiracy charge is readily apparent, as evidenced
by the government's own admission: "even if al Qaeda never
intended to put Moussaoui on one of the four planes on September
11, he would nonetheless be guilty of the charges specified ... if he
otherwise participated in the broad conspiracies charged."'24 This
application of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in United States v.
120. Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Access at 7-8, Moussaoui (No. 01-
455-A) ("Moussaoui is not charged ... with 'September 11.' ... Moussaoui is charged in six broad
conspiracy counts [including] ... the preparation for and execution of the terrorist attacks of
September 11.").
121. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 483-84 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citations
omitted).
122. Id. at 484.





Burgos,125 which explicated the boundaries of the conspiracy
doctrine, is technically correct, but the government's broad construc-
tion of the conspiracies to which they linked Moussaoui pushes the
boundaries of the doctrine.
As a comparison, consider that, in the prosecution of United
States v. Rahman, the government made no attempt to distinguish
between the actual events that had occurred, particularly with
respect to the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26,
1993, and the charged conspiracy. 126 Charged with seditious
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 2384, the defendants in Rahman had
both the benefit and the misfortune of a prosecutorial theory that
actively embraced a broadly construed agreement but that also
contained a less fluid standard than the regular conspiracy
charge.127 As observed by Suzanne Babb, "[t]he Rahman case
demonstrates a certain judicial pragmatism in reaching the end goal
of obtaining convictions involved in subversive activities." '128 Babb's
analysis suggests that a conspiracy charge may be preferable to
treason, even where the stringent requirements of treason can be
met, for the sole reason that it is an easier crime to digest. '29 The
seditious conspiracy charge, however, is relatively rare in current
judicial parlance. 3 ° As either a matter of expediency or simplicity,
prosecutors tend to employ more commonplace offenses against
terrorists and other political offenders.131 Babb's suggestion that the
125. 94 F.3d 849, 857-62 (4th Cir. 1996).
126. 189 F.3d 88, 104 (1999) (noting that "the Government sought to prove that the
defendants and others joined in a seditious conspiracy to wage a war of urban terrorism
against the United States and forcibly to oppose its authority").
127. See John Alan Cohan, Seditious Conspiracy, The Smith Act, and Prosecution for
Religious Speech Advocating the Violent Overthrow of Government, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 199, 227 (2003) ("The prosecution in seditious conspiracy cases must convince the
jury that the defendant's utterances issued a strong enough warning to meet the 'imminent
lawless action' standard.").
128. Suzanne Kelly Babb, Fear and Loathing in America: Application of Treason Law in
Times of National Crisis and the Case of John Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721, 1741
(2003).
129. Id.
130. Cohan, supra note 127, at 202-03 (noting that "[e]xcept for the prosecution of Sheik
Rahman and his co-defendants, modern-day sedition trials are almost unheard of').
131. See Combating Domestic Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 108, tbl.B-1 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing,
Combating Domestic Terrorism] (statement of Brent L. Smith, Professor and Chairman, Dep't
of Criminal Justice, Univ. of Ala.) (indicating that between 1982 and 1989, the principal
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right result was reached even though the charges might not have
been completely in synch with the crime committed is reminiscent
of the threat Justice Jackson warned of in his famous condemna-
tion of the expansion of the conspiracy doctrine in Krulewitch:
"[h]owever, even when appropriately invoked, the looseness and
pliability of the doctrine present inherent dangers which should be
in the background ofjudicial thought wherever it is sought to extend
the doctrine to meet the exigencies of a particular case." '132 Over fifty
years later this cautionary instruction now seems almost prescient.
The legal history of conspiracy surely indicated to Jackson and his
colleagues the relative rapidity with which change in this particular
arena could occur, but they surely could not have foreseen the
magnitude of the changes in and applications of conspiracy that
were to come.
In order to obtain a conviction against Moussaoui, the govern-
ment must prove the two essential conspiracy elements: that
there was an agreement to engage in unlawful conduct and that
Moussaoui knowingly and willfully aligned himself with the
conspiracy. '33 In Burgos, the Fourth Circuit explicitly restated these
fundamental conspiracy requirements, such that "the Government
must prove the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's
connection to it beyond a reasonable doubt."'" Implicit in these
requirements is the proof of the scope of the conspiracy. To demon-
strate the agreement, its terms must necessarily be proven, and a
prerequisite of proving a defendant's affiliation is demonstrating the
aspect of the conspiracy in which he was involved. Questions of
scope, however, are almost wholly fact-intensive and are largely
defined by reference to the agreement. 35 This reality gives the
prosecution wide latitude in both framing the central issues in the
case and determining what evidence will be offered.
The opinion in Burgos emphasized that "a conspiracy can have an
elusive quality and that a defendant may be convicted of conspiracy
charges brought against terrorists were: racketeering; possession of machine guns, destructive
devices, and certain other firearms; conspiracy; and RICO violations).
132. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 449 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
133. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 484-85 (E.D. Va. 2003).
134. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 861 (4th Cir. 1996).
135. JOSEPH F. MCSORLEY, A PORTABLE GUIDE TO FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW 151 (2d ed.
2003) (noting the consequences of not thoroughly considering the scope of the agreement).
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with little or no knowledge of the entire breadth of the criminal
enterprise, '  a tenet of conspiracy law that may prove highly
applicable to Moussaoui's prosecution. Consistent with established
law, in Moussaoui's case Judge Brinkema declared that the "scope
of the charged conspiracies ultimately are questions for the jury
to resolve." '137 The theory upon which the government prosecutes
Moussaoui will therefore have a significant impact on the scope of
the conspiracy. The grand jury has essentially drawn the initial
demarcations of the conspiracy in the allegations of the indictment,
irrevocably setting the stage for the jury's final determination.
To be sure, the prosecution of Moussaoui departs in some rather
significant ways from both the traditional deficiencies of the crime
of conspiracy as well as from the flaws in the McCarthy Era cases.
First, Moussaoui is the sole defendant in the case, which renders
much of the criticism leveled at mass prosecutions moot.13 Second,
the inchoateness of the conspiracy is less troubling here, because
Moussaoui's indictment alleges involvement in the criminal attacks
that actually occurred on September 11.139 The success of at least
one Of the conspiracy's objects somewhat allays concerns as to the
true scope of the conspiracy inasmuch as it tends to show in more
concrete terms the actual outline of the action intended. The fact
that the object of the conspiracy came to fruition, however, does not
necessarily make the determination of the conspiracy's scope any
less troubling, as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Compagna.4° Hand noted that
[m]y brothers think that ... it was relevant to show that the
scheme proved successful as part of the proof that there had
been a scheme at all. They believe that there is a rational
connection between the existence of the criminal agree-
ment-the "partnership in crime"-and the fact that the acts
136. Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858.
137. See Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 484; McSORLEY, supra note 135, at 159-60 (noting
that the question of scope is submitted to the jury where the evidence would permit a finding
of multiple conspiracies).
138. See Marcus, supra note 9, at 36-44.
139. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 450 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(expressing concer that "the conspiracy doctrine will incriminate persons on the fringe of
offending who would not be guilty of aiding and abetting or of becoming an accessory, for those
charges only lie when an act which is a crime has actually been committed").
140. 146 F.2d 524, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
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upon which the conspirators agreed, when carried out, had the
expected effect upon those against whom they were directed."'
Hand demurred from the majority's conclusion, finding that "[ilt
seems to me, on the other hand, that the only evidence relevant to
the existence of a conspiracy are facts which come, or at least might
have come, to the knowledge of the conspirators." '142 Richard Arens
echoed this sentiment nearly a decade later, noting that "[s]ince the
standard of proof of agreement is thus admittedly subjective and
hence unpredictable, the conspiracy doctrine operates, in effect, to
repress completed yet undefined activities."'43 What the conspirators
knew or should have known, in other words, should dictate the
scope of the criminal activity, evidence of an ostensibly completed
object notwithstanding.
Hand's reluctance to consider the success of the conspiracy in
determining its scope is not exclusive, however. In a prior opinion,
Hand noted that "[iut is never permissible to enlarge the scope of the
conspiracy itself by proving that some of the conspirators, unknown
to the rest, have done what was beyond the reasonable intendment
of the common understanding."'44 This basic tenet of conspiracy
law is deceptively simplistic in that it presupposes that, in the
course of unraveling the original conspiracy, there will be no
residual taint from the subsequent actions, thus exculpating those
conspirators who were not party to the enlargement. As a result,
even if Moussaoui's defense team is successful in proving that his
involvement extended no further than preliminary ruminations
about the possibility of undertaking massive attacks against the
United States, the inclusion of proof respecting the September 11
plot will almost certainly influence the jury's ultimate decision.
The prosecutorial decision reflected in the indictment has
significant ramifications both in and outside the courtroom. By
placing the events of September 11 on center stage, the govern-
ment's theory satisfies the public demand that the perpetrators of
the attacks be made to answer for their misdeeds and also fulfills
141. Id. at 528.
142. Id. at 529.
143. Arens, supra note 77, at 267 (emphasis added).
144. United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).
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the quasi-judicial role of prosecutors in determining what acts to
punish.
Speaking before the House Judiciary Committee in the aftermath
of the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, Professor Brent
Smith noted that "[flederal prosecutors basically have two options
[with respect to terrorism cases]. They can choose to pursue these
cases as traditional offenders under conventional criminal cases
or to explicitly politicize the case by emphasizing the terroristic
goals and motives of the perpetrator. Clearly, injecting the terrorist
motives creates prosecutorial problems." '145 Smith characterizes the
attempt to use explicitly political offenses as the grounds for
prosecution as a "much less fruitful strategy" and concludes that
"prosecutors have been correct in choosing to minimize political
motives in most terrorism cases."'46 Underlying Smith's condemna-
tion of overtly political criminal statutes is a suggestion that
prosecutions that are even partly predicated on potentially unpopu-
lar political viewpoints--even when those viewpoints are manifested
in actions that run afoul of the criminal law-are fundamentally
distasteful to the American judicial system.
Observing that September 11 altered the balance of institutional
power relationships in American politics, Allan J. Cigler noted that
"[i]n times of international crisis Americans typically 'rally around
the flag,' enhancing the power of the executive branch vis-i-vis both
Congress and the judiciary." '47 There can be no question that the
prosecution of Moussaoui and other terrorists intimately involves
concerns about public welfare. Indeed, in addressing the issue of
whether an interlocutory appeal could be taken from an order
directing the deposition of an enemy combatant, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that "we are cognizant that this case involves
substantial national security concerns." 45
In the first World Trade Center bombing case, United States v.
Salameh, the government introduced fairly extensive evidence of
"terrorist materials" seized from one of the co-conspirators, includ-
145. Hearing, Combating Domestic Terrorism, supra note 131, at 102 (statement of Brent
L. Smith, Professor and Chairman, Dep't of Criminal Justice, Univ. of Ala.).
146. Id.
147. PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM: How 9/11 CHANGED U.S. POLITICS 3 (Allan J. Cigler ed.,
2002).
148. United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 2003).
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ing a document entitled "Facing the enemies of God terrorism is a
religious duty and force is necessary."'49 The court held that the
admission of this book, in conjunction with a number of bomb-
making manuals and video tapes, was appropriate in part because
"evidence that provides background information necessary to the
jury's understanding of the nature of the conspiratorial agreement
properly is admitted 'to furnish an explanation of the understanding
or intent with which certain acts were performed."'1 ° Without
question, the prosecution's theory relied on proof that the defen-
dants were connected through their religious and anti-American
beliefs, and this publication, found to be in the possession of two of
the conspirators,15" ' was used to show the intent with which the
criminal acts were performed. However, the court's willingness to
admit such evidence raises serious questions as to how much
"background information" the government should be allowed to
provide.
To be sure, in Salameh, the materials admitted as background
information bore strong indicia that they would shed light on the
issue of intent. As the court noted, "[tihe materials possessed by
both [Defendants] Ajaj and Abouhalima bristled with strong anti-
American sentiment and advocated violence against targets in
the United States." '52 There can be relatively little doubt that
the conspirators joined together in criminal enterprise with the
intent to commit an offense against an American target. The court
correctly contemplated the possible prejudicial effect of the
materials, noting that "[t]he sulphurous anti-American sentiments
expressed in the terrorist materials no doubt threatened to preju-
dice the jury," but the court failed to consider the potentially
deleterious precedent that it was establishing by throwing open the
door to "background information necessary to the jury's understand-
ing of the nature of the conspiratorial agreement." ' 3
The court in Salameh further explained that these materials were
properly admitted for the dual purposes of providing background
149. 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998).
150. Id. at 111 (quoting United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir. 1988)).
151. Id. at 110-11 (noting that a copy was seized from defendant Ajaj and another was
found at defendant Abouhalima's residence).




information for establishing the scope of the conspiracy and
establishing the motive and intent of the conspirators. 54 Without
overly parsing the court's phraseology, it seems important to note
that the use of background information in establishing the scope of
a conspiracy is entirely inappropriate. The scope of a joint criminal
enterprise is typically used as the framework upon which a
prosecutorial theory is built, and the scope therefore serves as the
backbone of the case. For the court to admit background evidence as
to scope in order to support the framework of the case is contrary to
the general purpose of background evidence.
Semantics aside, the Salameh opinion is evidence of courts'
highly receptive attitude toward broadly construed conspiracies
in situations of politically tinged violence. The opinion expresses no
doubt about the appropriateness of an expansively constructed
scope. In fact, the panel noted that "the government argued to the
jury that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to bomb buildings,
vehicles and property in the United States and the World Trade
Center bombing was one act committed in furtherance of the overall
conspiracy." 55 In addition, the court dismissed the defendants'
objections to the charge-that a more specific conspiracy to bomb
the World Trade Center had been constructively alleged-as not
clearly supported by the evidence."'
Although clearly understated, implicit in the context of the
Salameh proceedings was the sense that the court was not merely
dealing with conspirators but with terrorists. The court noted that
[t]he most definitive proof of the broad scope of the conspiracy
and the defendants' intent to commit additional bombings after
the World Trade Center was the letter sent to the New York
Times claiming responsibility for the bombing and the similar
draft letter retrieved from an erased file on Ayyad's computer
disk, both of which speak to future acts of terrorism.'57
As history unfolded, so too did the future acts of terrorism that the
court had predicted. In August 1998, bombs exploded in the U.S.
154. Id. at 116.
155. Id. at 146.
156. Id. at 147.
157. Id.
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embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing
more than 260 people, including twelve Americans, and leaving
more than 5,000 injured.158 The resulting prosecution of Osama Bin
Laden and fourteen other members of al Qaeda ran headlong into
the problem of how to address charges of "numerous offenses arising
out of [the defendants'] alleged involvement in an international
terrorist organization ... and [in] that organization's alleged
involvement in the August, 1998 bombings." '159
At the time of Judge Sand's March 30, 2000 opinion, the indict-
ment named fifteen defendants and "accuse [d] them of participating
in several long-lasting, wide-ranging conspiracies to attack United
States personnel (including civilians) and property."'6 ° Defendant
Al-'Owhali made a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds
that it "labels a decade-long international political and religious
movement involving dozens of countries, scores of organizations,
and thousands of persons as a single 'conspiracy."'161 Perhaps
unwittingly, Al-'Owhali delivered an almost exact recital of the
traditional elements used to define the scope of a conspiracy as
applied to his case by claiming that the conspiracy charged was too
sprawling to be taken seriously. The court, however, refused to
entertain his argument in a rather tellingly dismissive tone.
16 2
Judge Sand's hesitance to review extensively the scope of the
charged conspiracy is indicative of the willingness of courts to accept
a broader construction of conspiracy than might be allowed in the
case of other criminal offenses. Sand reiterates that "it appears
to be well settled that a conspiracy 'may be alleged as broadly as
the conspiracy really was"' and that the government is due great
deference in its good-faith construction of the conspiracy and its
158. John J. Goldman, Kenya Bombing Suspect Admits Bin Laden Link, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
29, 1998, at Al.
159. United States v. Bin Laden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
160. Id. at 606-07 (noting further that "[tihe indictment charges the 15 named Defendants
with 267 discrete criminal offenses" and that "[e]ach of the Defendants is also charged with
participating in at least five distinct criminal conspiracies," but that the allegations with
respect to each conspiracy significantly overlapped).
161. Id. at 608 (quoting Al-'Owhali's Notice of Motion at 1).
162. Id. ("[O]nce the discrete legal issues he raises are separately identified and examined
in accordance with settled principles of law, it becomes clear that they cannot withstand




contemplated objectives."6 ' Sand adopted a wholly practical
approach to conspiracy composition and scope issues during the
course of the Bin Laden trial, and his decisions in that respect
generally seem to have reached a just result. 164 Nonetheless, a
system that is wholly reliant on judicial pragmatism in reigning in
over-broad conspiracy charges creates serious doubt as to its ability
to protect defendants' constitutional rights.
From the foregoing it is clear that one of the principal attractions
of the conspiracy charge in cases that arouse concerns about
national security is the ability of the conspiracy doctrine to sweep
into its net a vast array of evidence and background information
that might not otherwise be available. The immense potential for
even the appearance of impropriety should give prosecutors pause
in deciding how broadly to cut the swath of conspiracy and define its
scope.
CONCLUSION
In the post-9/11 era, criminal conspiracy in particular and the
civilian judicial system in general have emerged as important
enforcement mechanisms in the government's war on terrorism. 65
As a result of this perhaps misplaced reliance on the deterrent effect
of the criminal justice system, new pressures have been exerted on
relatively old concepts, a process that has produced hairline
fractures in otherwise stable, if rather expansively interpreted,
doctrines. The danger posed by the continued over-use of conspiracy
statutes is to widen those fractures into gaping chasms into which
both individual rights and the integrity of the judicial system may
be swallowed.
163. Id. at 610 (quoting Burton v. United States, 175 F.2d 960, 963 (5th Cir. 1949)).
164. United States v. Bin Laden, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15484, at *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(noting that the "broad scope of the conspiracy charges led the Court to believe that it was
appropriate to permit such wide ranging inquiry by defense counsel" during direct and cross-
examination).
165. See NORMAN ABRAMs, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 1 (2003) (noting
that "[a] regimen of crimes and special approaches to criminal procedure (including
investigation and detention) is being used in the government's effort that differs from much
of ordinary criminal process").
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The use of conspiracy in wartime prosecutions is not novel, nor is
it inappropriate in many cases.'66 Unfortunately, however, the
"elasticity of its substantive and procedural attributes" creates
"serious dangers of abuse and oppression.""' 7 That historically the
most pronounced expansion of the doctrine came at a time of social
unrest should serve as a cautionary sign of the government's
tendency to use conspiracy to address social issues in a judicial
forum. 6 ' To preserve judicial integrity, it is imperative that history
not be repeated. Where conspiracy once "clearly became a powerful
weapon of public policy, and its expansion promptly reflected the
infusion of morals into law,"'69 it should today be construed as
strictly as all other crimes, and all potential moral infusions should
be vigorously guarded against.
At least one scholar has challenged the notion that historical
examples of extraordinary measures taken during times of national
crisis constituted "overreactions to the threats to national security,"
citing as examples Lincoln's unconstitutional suspension of habeas
corpus and the internment of Japanese-Americans during World
War II.17 ° Richard A. Posner asserts that a "fluid approach [to civil
liberties] is only common sense."'' Posner explains that the proper
mechanism for understanding our legal rights is through bifurcation
of our collective interests into the "public-safety interest and the
liberty interest."'72 On balance, argues Posner, neither interest
should trump the other, although there will be times when one is
clearly dominant.'73 Significantly, Posner also writes that:
I want to emphasize something else, however: the malleability
of law, its pragmatic rather than dogmatic character. The law is
not absolute, and the slogan "Fiat iustitia ruat caelum" ("Let
166. See Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of
Individual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REV. 276, 276-77 (1948) (noting the "recent application
of the doctrine in the war crimes trials").
167. Id. at 277.
168. Id. at 277 n.5.
169. Id.
170. Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Liberties, in PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM,
supra note 147, at 59, 60-61.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 60.
173. Id. ("'They are both important, and their relative importance changes from time to time
and from situation to situation.").
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justice be done though the heavens fall") is dangerous nonsense.
The law is a human creation rather than a divine gift, a tool of
government rather than a mandarin mystery. It is an instru-
ment for promoting social welfare, and as the conditions
essential to that welfare change, so must it change. '74
The evolution of the conspiracy doctrine indicates just such a
dynamic approach to the law; however, even the most thoroughly
pragmatic approach cannot sanction the wholesale evisceration of
basic doctrinal principles on the basis of an altered public opinion.
The solution to promoting social welfare in the face of terrorism lies
not in disrupting the foundational elements of our penal code but in
utilizing the code in a disciplined way, and perhaps even creating
new laws narrowly tailored to prohibit such extreme anti-social
behavior. '7
The political and social interests at stake in the McCarthy Era
and post-9/11 trials are reflected in the theories of prosecution
during those time periods.'76 Writing nearly two years after the
September 11 attacks, Professor David Cole elaborated on historical
analogies that had been made as early as a few weeks after the
174. Id. at 61-62.
175. But see Hearing, Combating Domestic Terrorism, supra note 131, at 103 (statement
of Brent L. Smith, Professor and Chairman, Dep't of Criminal Justice, Univ. of Ala.):
With regard to some recommendations, I would recommend that we avoid the
temptation to create terrorism-specific statutes. Because terrorism by definition
includes motive as an essential element of the crime, such statutes are fraught
with constitutional problems.... I would continue efforts to prosecute terrorists
for traditional offenses. Such a strategy minimizes the notion of political
persecution, as well as preventing trials from becoming mired in ideological
debate. A caveat is in order, however. Severity of punishment continues to be
largely affected b[y] presentence investigations. Safeguards must be established
to ensure that political motive does not become the major criterion of sentence
length for persons convicted of terrorism-related activities.
See also Leon Friedman, Constitutional Limits to the Fight Against Terrorism, 19 TOURO L.
REV. 97, 100 (2002) ('Moussaoui, who allegedly was the twentieth highjacker on September
11, was charged with regular U.S. crimes. The shoe bomber, who pleaded guilty this morning,
was charged only with regular U.S. crimes.").
176. See Second Superceding Indictment at 2, 4, United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp.
2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 01-455-A) (noting that "Bin Laden and al Qaeda violently opposed
the United States for several reasons" and that "camps [in Afghanistan] were used to conduct
operational planning against United States targets around the world and experiments in the
use of chemical and biological weapons"), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/
1:01-Cr-00455/docs/66826/0.pdf.
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attack:177 "[t]oday's war on terrorism has already demonstrated our
government's remarkable ability to evolve its tactics in ways that
allow it simultaneously to repeat history and to insist that it is not
repeating history."'78 Indeed, although the excesses of the McCarthy
Era have not been repeated per se, the social and political climate
following the September 11 attacks was so similar that it could not
have helped but breed a sense that some procedural, and even
substantive, alterations in the system were acceptable. An atypi-
cally introspective and calm response to the attacks came in the
form of a Washington Post editorial on the day after the attacks:
"[t]he challenge ahead will require strengthening U.S. defenses and
intelligence at home in ways consistent with American values." '179
This drive for consistency with American values must extend
beyond the military and intelligence arenas-it must inhere in the
judicial system as well.
Distinguishing between conspiracies that are fundamentally
economic and those that are political, Richard Arens, writing in the
wake of the Red Scare, noted that
[u]nder the strain and stress of the bipolarization of world
power, Communists ... have indeed come to be viewed as
"sinister persons" who, if not "meeting by twilight with pointed
hats" can be counted on at all hours to be engaged in more
mischief with less melodrama.
In increasing measure public attitudes have tended toward
the identification of the Communist as a threat toward the
internal as well as the external security of the non-Communist
nation."s
This explicit recognition of the particular tension that accrues in
times of both perceived and actual political instability surfaces
again in Arens' further observations that "it is elementary that
177. John Lancaster & Jonathan Krim, Ashcroft Presents Anti-Terrorism Plan to Congress;
Lawmakers Promise Swift Action, Disagree on Extent of Measures, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,
2001, at A24 (quoting Shari Steele, Executive Director and President of Electronic Frontier
Foundation, as saying that Attorney General John Ashcroft's plan was "almost
McCarthyesque").
178. David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2003).
179. Editorial, September 11, 2001, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A30.
180. Arens, supra note 77, at 263-64.
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every organized government will seek to secure its authority against
organized violence" and that "[n]one can question, therefore, the
reasonableness of the superimposition of the general prohibition
against conspiracy over the various overt crimes against security." '
Arens' unquestioning acceptance of the government's use of
conspiracy reveals a judicial double-standard of sorts: when a
defendant is clearly guilty in the court of public opinion, it hardly
matters how much doctrinal deviation is required to produce a
conviction. For these purposes, there is no more reliably pliable
doctrine than that of conspiracy.
In a rather ironic twist of legal historical development, the
doctrine of conspiracy, originally conceived as a strictly circum-
scribed mechanism whereby the perversion of justice was
remedied," 2 today stands as one of the most expansive and sprawl-
ing offenses in the criminal lexicon. The dangers inherent in the
conspiracy doctrine have not gone unnoticed, however, as the
opinion in United States v. Falcone suggested: "[t]hat there are
opportunities of great oppression in such a doctrine is very plain,
and it is only by circumscribing the scope of such all-comprehensive
indictments that they can be avoided.""18 Indeed, although penned
almost 200 years ago, the words of Chief Judge Cranch in United
States v. Bollman are still applicable today:
In times like these, when the public mind is agitated, when
wars, and rumors of wars, plots, conspiracies and treasons excite
alarm, it is the duty of a court to be peculiarly watchful lest the
public feeling should reach the seat of justice, and thereby
precedents be established which may become the ready tools of
faction in times more disastrous. The worst of precedents may
be established from the best of motives.&
181. Id. at 264-65.
182. BRYAN, supra note 6, at 25 n.2, 26 (noting that the "Definition of Conspirators ... was
confined in its terms almost exclusively to combinations to pervert justice" and further that
"unless the complainant's case could be brought within the words of these standard writs, he
was obliged to seek another remedy or, failing in this, go without legal redress altogether").
The Definition of Conspirators was promulgated by Edward III, who reigned from 1327-1377.
Id. at 25.
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The precedents that may be established under the influence of the
unusually strong political and social pressures aroused by the threat
of terrorist attacks could rank among the worst as a result of their
corrosive effect on jurisprudential stability.
Marie E. Siesseger
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